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Abstract Gentrification has become part and parcel of urban policies throughout the
world. Critics have argued against those policies but they have not yet developed concrete
and comprehensive alternatives. This paper seeks to remedy this omission by investigating
the Belgian ‘housing contract’ experiment (2005–2007). Quite exceptionally, Belgium’s
‘housing contract’ experiment was based on the premise that housing policies should
improve the quality of life in deprived urban neighborhoods without displacing the poor.
We investigate both the philosophy of the housing contract experiment as well as its
effects. On the basis of this evaluation, we sketch the contours of a housing policy that
incorporates rent gap theory and counters the negative effects arising from disinvestment
and gentrification.
Keywords Gentrification  Housing policy  Urban policy  Displacement 
Rent gap theory  Belgium
1 Introduction
Recent scholarship has mapped the neoliberalization of state policy throughout the world
(Hackworth 2007; Brenner et al. 2010; Kuyucu and U¨nsal 2010; Narsiah 2010; MacLeod
and Johnstone 2012; Theodore and Peck 2012; Uitermark 2011; Van Gent 2012; Brenner
and Theodore 2002). While the decommodification of housing was hitherto an important
goal for many governments, today the reduction of social housing dominates policy
agendas. Neoliberal urban renewal policies aim to create ‘diverse’, ‘prosperous’,
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‘balanced’ or ‘vital’ neighborhoods, even if this means that poor households are forced to
relocate. For instance, in the Netherlands, housing corporations are upgrading, demolishing
and selling social housing in order to increase livability and improve a neighborhood’s
position within the urban system (Uitermark et al. 2007). In the United States, policy
programs like HOPE VI and Moving to Opportunity aim to disperse low-income house-
holds. Such mixed-income housing policies, James DeFilippis and Jim Fraser argue, ‘‘are
largely based on the (hegemonic) mantra that low-income people themselves are the
problem, and that a benevolent gentry needs to colonize their home space in order to create
the conditions necessary to help the poor ‘bootstrap’ themselves into a better socioeco-
nomic position’’ (DeFilippis and Fraser 2010, p. 136). In the United Kingdom, promoting
gentrification has been a key component of policy efforts since Blair’s governments sought
to tackle urban problems by ushering in an ‘‘urban renaissance’’ (Lees 2008; MacLeod and
Johnstone 2012). These examples illustrate that gentrification has become part and parcel
of urban policy and that already disadvantaged groups may bear the burden (Atkinson
2000; Smith 2006). In this context, it has been argued that the rhetoric of social mixing
masks displacement processes and thus establishes gentrification by stealth rather than
force (Bridge et al. 2012) The urban policies of the Belgian regional governments of
Flanders and Brussels are in line with these general trends (Loopmans et al. 2007;
Loopmans 2008; Loopmans et al. 2010; Van Criekingen 2008, 2012).
However, for a brief period of time (2005–2007), Belgium’s federal urban renewal
policy was an exception to the rule. As we will show, Belgium’s federal housing
contract experiment aimed to improve the living conditions in deprived neighborhoods
without causing displacement of vulnerable groups. Although the housing contract
experiment is far from radical in that it pursues modest reforms and is constrained by
very limited budgets (69.7 million euro divided among 17 local governments between
2005–2007, Rekenhof 2007, p. 9), it nevertheless provides us with the opportunity to
see how policies not aiming at gentrification work in practice and how they might be
improved. The critical analysis of this case enables us to address the problem, observed
by Lees (2003), that gentrification researchers have focused more on criticizing extant
policies than engaging with policy and thinking through concrete alternatives. The most
recent contributions to the debate (Lees et al. 2008; Loopmans et al. 2010; Bridge et al.
2012) make abundantly clear that the rhetoric of social mix or revitalization can mask
attempts to displace poor households. But they also highlight a need to explore how
renewal can be designed so that it (also or primarily) benefits weaker groups on the
housing market.
In this policy review, we first provide an introduction to Belgian’s federal housing
contract policy and analyze how it obtained its particular character. Secondly, we show
how the policy experiment played out between 2005 (the year of its inception) until
2007 (the experiment ended in 2008). On the basis of interviews with policy makers, 17
contracts between the local and the federal governments, the evaluation sheets of
federal officials, and secondary literature on the policy, we investigate the nature of the
projects sponsored by federal funds. Thirdly, we show how, in translating federal goals
into local policy projects, a process of goal displacement took place: although the
federal government expressly tried to prevent federal funds from being used for mea-
sures that might cause displacement of lower-income groups, local governments in
Flanders nevertheless managed to use these funds to buttress their gentrification poli-
cies. Fourthly, we draw from gentrification theory to offer a number of suggestions on
how a housing policy for urban renewal can be formulated that avoids gentrification
and displacement.
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2 The political roots of Belgium’s housing contract experiment
While other West-European countries developed increasingly ambitious urban policies in
the 1970s and 1980s, the Belgian government did not have policies to combat urban
decline until the mid-1990s (Cheshire and Hay 1989). Two factors account for the un-
derdevelopment of federal urban policies. The first one is the historically powerful position
of the Christian-Democrats. The Christian-Democrats dominated the Belgian government
and used their power to strengthen their base in rural areas through the promotion of home-
ownership and affordable transportation (Kesteloot and De Maesschalck 2001; Uitermark
2003; De Decker 2008). In effect, home-ownership has become a major pillar of the
Belgian welfare state and constitutes an alternative to social security provision (De Decker
and Dewilde 2010). The second factor is the difference between the three Belgian regions.
These differences are not only related to diverging interests and beliefs between regional
policy makers but also to the make-up of cities. Cities of the nineteenth century Walloon
industrial axis face deeply entrenched problems, both in the physical condition of the built
environment and the social situation of its residents. Flemish cities as well as Brussels have
a much stronger profile. One of the most telling indicators is the population evolution of
cities (see Loopmans et al. 2007). Various Flemish cities never experienced a population
decline in their recent history, and most Flemish cities, as well as Brussels, saw the
population in their inner cities increase after 2000. In Wallonia, most inner cities initiated
their population decline earlier and have kept on losing population till today. The largest
cities in Wallonia even face population decline in their Functional Urban Region and have
long been ‘shrinking’ (Bontje 2004).
Within this context it is not at all evident that federal policy makers have developed
renewal policies. Indeed, the first, still comparatively modest, urban policy initiatives were
taken at the regional rather than the federal level. The first attempts to develop urban
policies at the federal level were made in 1999, when for the first time in postwar history
the Christian-Democrats were kept out of government. The largely ‘urban-based’ coalition
of green, liberal and socialist parties (De Maesschalck and Loopmans 2003; De Mae-
sschalck 2010) set up a new federal urban policy fund. Charles Picque´, a francophone
socialist minister, was the first minister of urban policy. Over time, the policy acquired an
increasingly ‘social’ profile. To gain insight into urban deprivation in Belgium, Picque´
ordered a group of left-leaning academics to identify ‘neighborhoods in difficulties’. The
resulting ‘Neighborhood Atlas’ provided a graphic representation of the relation between
space and deprivation, thus focusing both public and policy attention on deprived neigh-
borhoods and their residents (Kesteloot et al. 2001). The coordination of the policy was
relegated to a subdivision of the Federal Department of Social Integration. Together with
the socialist background of its minister, this further contributed to the increasingly ‘social
character’ of the federal urban renewal policy. As a civil servant of the Big Cities division
explained:
Giving control to a ‘social affairs’ ministry contributed to the social character of our
renewal policy; I’ve met several of my European colleagues who are in economic or
planning departments; they do not necessarily have the same innate social reflex as
us. (interview member of Big Cities division, Federal Department of Social Inte-
gration, 21-12-2010).
In terms of organization, the federal Big Cities Policy takes its inspiration from the French
Politique de la Ville, the European URBAN program and the Flemish urban policy. Local
authorities enter into a result-oriented contract with the federal authorities, thereby
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receiving financial support for specific urban development projects. While the federal
policy did not stipulate the exact content of the contracts between the cities and the federal
government, the Big Cities division kept an eye on ‘the social character’ of their initiatives
and sometimes used its discretionary power as subsidizing agent to curb what they
considered ‘anti-social’ measures.
This structure was in place when, in 2005, the new minister for Big Cities Policy,
Christian Dupont, another francophone socialist, took the initiative to introduce ‘housing
contracts’ as a separate, experimental wing in the policy. The minister argued that housing
measures were necessary to reinforce social cohesion and social integration in cities. In
particular, rack-renting by slumlords (renting substandard housing to easy-to-exploit
groups like undocumented migrants and poor people), underinvestment in housing and
gentrification-induced displacement were considered negative effects of contemporary
urban development (interview federal coordinator Big Cities Policy, 21-12-2010). The
strategy of the housing contract policy is to tackle problems of ‘‘insecurity, impoverish-
ment, speculation and lacking infrastructure in urban neighborhoods by stimulating social
mix and social cohesion in deprived areas through housing sector interventions’’ (POD
Maatschappelijke Integratie 2005, p. 5). Aware of the potential perverse effects of social
mixing policies, policy makers stipulated that social mixing should ‘‘not lead to the dis-
location of problems of exclusion to other neighborhoods’’ (Ibid., p. 15). The federal
government in particular wanted to meet the housing needs of the lowest-income groups
who have difficulties in securing decent housing on the private market; consequently,
households above a (regionally established) maximum income level are not counted among
the policy’s target groups.
The policy defines four priorities that can be targeted by cities. First, the number of
high-quality dwellings for lower-income groups should be increased. Second, the policy
should help low- or middle-income people with insufficient means to attain a house in the
city. Third, measures should be taken to counter vacancy, dilapidation and the exploitation
of poor households by slumlords. Fourth, interventions in the housing market should
be used as a stepping stone to more generally improve the situation of precarious groups
like the homeless, long-term unemployed, former prisoners or battered women (POD
Maatschappelijke Integratie 2005, p. 8).
3 Social displacement as goal displacement
Although the federal government had a strong political motivation to develop a federal
policy next to regional and local policies, goals were intentionally set in general terms. The
formal policy document has to allow the minister to further specify own priorities along the
way and local governments to develop innovative projects targeted to their particular local
needs. When we examine the allocation of budgets and projects over the four priorities as
defined by the federal minister, we observe striking regional differences (Table 1). In
Flanders, almost one-third of the projects and 69 % of the budget are devoted to achieving
target 2, i.e. to facilitate housing acquisition for low- to middle-income groups. In Wal-
lonia, this target is selected in only 8 % of the projects, while 72 % of the projects and
95 % of the budget are oriented towards the struggle against slumlords, vacancies and
abandonment. In Brussels, finally, the budget is split equally across three different prior-
ities (increasing the stock of qualitative rental housing; combating slumlords, vacancies
and abandonment; and reintegrating deprived groups through access to housing).
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In part, this divergence reflects actual differences on the ground in each of the regions.
Walloon cities invest much more in the struggle against vacancies and slumlords than the
other two regions, and cities in Flanders sometimes use the funds to include subsidized
housing in otherwise market-driven projects. However, the differences also reflect their
discrete political choices and ideologies. Flanders, which is under strong Anglo-Saxon
ideological influence, has adopted the neoliberal urban development approach as found in
the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. For years, Flemish cities have promoted gentri-
fication under the pretext of social mixing (Loopmans 2008; Loopmans et al. 2010).
In this context, the different emphases with respect to the second priority are especially
revealing. This is the only priority for which cities have some discretionary authority to
target residents who are not among the most vulnerable in the population. The idea behind
this priority was that policy makers could help low- and lower-middle income groups to
secure a place in cities. With this in mind, both the Brussels and Walloon region defined
maximum income levels to delineate the ‘lower-middle class’. The Flemish region,
however, did not formulate such a general criterion, and cities were allowed to delimit this
target group autonomously. Consequently, Flemish cities exploited the opportunity to
expand the target group so as to divert funds away from the most marginalized to the
middle class. Moreover, some cities even refused to define maximum income levels so as
to allow subsidizing of market-oriented property development. As one federal official
noted in an evaluation of a local plan:
To our regret, the regulations don’t stipulate the conditions concerning the income of
the tenant which allows the private owner to let its premises to higher-income
Table 1 Distribution of budget and projects across the 4 policy priorities, 2005–2007
Region Target Number
of projects
Total budget
(incl. co
financing)
% Projects % Budget
Brussels 1. Quality rental housing 8 6,644,400 35 30
2. Homeownership support 1 361,000 4 2
3. Anti-rack renting/dilapidation 6 5,153,224 26 24
4. Transversal actions 5 9,409,432 22 43
Coordination 3 351,120 13 2
Total 23 21,919,175 100 100
Flanders 1. Quality rental housing 4 8,562,782 16 11
2. Homeownership support 8 53,264,868 32 67
3. Anti-rack renting/dilapidation 7 11,839,366 28 15
4. Transversal actions 4 5,157,800 16 7
Coordination 2 310,400 8 0.4
Total 25 79,135,216 100 100
Wallonia 1. Quality rental housing 3 520,000 12 2
2. Homeownership support 2 195,000 8 1
3. Anti-rack renting/dilapidation 18 23,488,923 72 96
4. Transversal actions 0 0 0 0
Coordination 2 199,304 8 1
Total 25 24,403,227 100 100
Source POD Maatschappelijke Integratie 2005–2007 housing contracts
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groups, which is not the intention. There is a risk that the system is abused and that
this subsidy benefits a group which does not need it. (except from an evaluation form
on renovation subsidies in private rental housing in a Flemish city).
Belgian officials noted that cities used a range of measures—or ‘tricks’—to interpret the
rules in relation to subsidized housing in such a way as to facilitate gentrification:
Another trick of the cities was not to fix in advance the ratio between rental apart-
ments and apartments for sale. As buying an apartment is not accessible for the
lowest-income groups, the overprovision of apartments for sale was a trick to
exclude those groups from the project. (interview with federal official, 09/07/2008).
Federal officials intending to halt what they regarded as the abuse of federal means ‘for the
poor’ to the benefit ‘of the rich’ regularly clashed with local governments over this issue
(interview federal official, 11/12/2010). In its evaluation of the federal housing contracts,
the Audit Office raised a similar criticism: ‘‘too often, ‘social mixing’ meant the attraction
of higher-income groups in poor neighborhoods, with little or no means to check possible
negative outcomes such as displacement of lower-income groups’’ (Rekenhof 2007, p. 48).
In response to such gentrification efforts, federal officials tried to reason with local policy
makers or pressured them to change the plans:
In the city of X, there was a project where we subsidized the acquisition of buildings
that were in use as brothels in order to turn them into housing. We found out that the
buildings were subsequently torn down and that the plot was sold off to a private
developer to construct luxury lofts instead. In this case, we firmly opposed. (inter-
view with federal official, 09/07/2008).
While recognizing that such efforts to promote gentrification ran counter to the stated
policy objectives and the underlying policy philosophy, federal officials found it difficult to
develop a well-grounded argument with local governments about the type of measures
most suitable for the cases at hand. Federal policy makers remained dependent upon and
locked in by the detailed problem analyses provided by local policy makers.
4 Rent gap theory and social urban renewal
We observed that the federal housing contract policy was intended to promote ‘social
urban renewal’ but that local governments sometimes used federal funds to promote
gentrification.
Federal officials had the ambition to implement a policy primarily meant to aid the most
vulnerable groups on the housing market but lacked an urban theory that could help them
to determine which local measures would be appropriate. Rent gap theory (Smith 1996;
Lees et al. 2008, chapter 2) may be of help in remedying this omission as it can inform a
logic through which appropriate local interventions can be determined.
The rent gap is the ‘‘disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual
ground rent capitalized under the present land use’’ (Smith 1996, p. 67). This disparity is
likely to be small immediately after a building is erected. Over time, the building loses its
value: its design becomes anachronistic, its fabric dilapidates, its amenities no longer meet
the highest standards. As the value of the building goes down, so does the rent and the
socio-economic status of the inhabitants. At the end of the cycle, landlords milk the
dilapidated properties by renting them out, legally or illegally, to inhabitants lacking access
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to the more attractive parts of the housing stock. As the building deteriorates, the rent gap
grows. The disparity between the potential and actual ground rent is further increased if it
is situated in a location that is increasingly central as a result of outward urban expansion.
When the difference between the maximum rent and the actual rent is large enough, a
reinvestment is made and the plot is upgraded through renovation or new construction for
inhabitants able to furnish higher rents.
The concept of the rent gap invites us to take a dynamic and geographical view of
housing markets. The cyclical process of investment, disinvestment and reinvestment
occurs in different places at different moments, creating a constant ebb and flow of
investment capital and inhabitants across space and through time. However, the process of
boom and bust is not a given; it only takes place when there are social inequalities and
when the housing stock is so much commodified that these inequalities find an expression
in urban space. The function of a renewal policy can thus be to attenuate this process: it can
ensure that (1) unattractive neighborhoods do not degenerate to the extent that they contain
only people left without other options and that (2) attractive neighborhoods do not gentrify
to the extent that only higher-income groups can enter or remain there.
From this perspective, the trajectory of a neighborhood is more relevant for determining
if and how it should be targeted than its composition. When neighborhoods are experi-
encing disinvestment, the government can step in and compensate by covering unprofitable
investments or supporting provisions suffering from disinvestment. When neighborhoods
are receiving investments, government policy would aim at preserving the rent gap.
Policies can for instance reduce direct and exclusionary displacement (Marcuse 1986;
Davidson and Lees 2005; Slater 2009) through rent regulation, the expansion of social
housing, or a combination of both. Finally, there is no need for territorial investment when
neighborhoods are stable.
This counter-cyclical investment logic provides a straightforward way to identify where
and how investments should be made. Rather than providing extensive lists of the kind of
measures that might be taken or the actors that might be involved, it provides a rough but
clear guide on how federal funds should be spent. While straightforward, this logic does
take into account geographical diversity. In the particular case of Belgium, it suggests
focusing efforts to attenuate displacement on the booming Flemish cities and Brussels
while attempting to rejuvenate Walloon cities suffering from disinvestment. The counter-
cyclical investment logic moreover facilitates social mixing in the long term. Rather than
promoting gentrification in affordable yet attractive areas—the easiest way to promote
social mixing in the short term and the surest way to create exclusion in the long term—
efforts are aimed at preserving diversity in booming areas by blocking a closure of the rent
gap. In contrast to current mixing policies in Belgium and elsewhere, these types of
measures directly benefit the weakest households on the market and attenuate overall levels
of socio-spatial inequality.
Within the Belgian context, the tools for selecting neighborhoods through this logic
were available. In 2007, the federal government commissioned a new Atlas that provided a
dynamic analysis of ‘neighborhoods in difficulties’ (Kesteloot et al. 2007). This Atlas and
its planned updates could have become important decision making tools for federal offi-
cials to decide about the suitability of proposed projects. However, the Atlas has only been
used in the background, for the formulation of general policy goals, and failed to be
deployed in the negotiations with local policy makers. Today, the context for developing
an anti-cyclical urban policy is less favorable. The housing policy contracts have been
subsumed under the general urban policy, decreasing the possibilities to target investments
to housing measures for the most deprived groups. This urban policy, finally, is not
Urban renewal without displacement? 163
123
expected to survive for long: at the moment of writing, Belgium’s regions are drifting
further apart and urban policies are on the short list to be downscaled to the regions.
5 Conclusion
Belgium’s federal urban renewal policy is exceptional in that it aims to benefit the weakest
groups on the housing market and protect them against displacement. However, as we have
shown, local governments had the chance to pervert the federal housing policy by using it
to promote gentrification. One reason for this has simply to do with power relations—the
Flemish cities had enough discretionary authority to infuse their preference for gentrifi-
cation into the federal policy. But another reason is that federal officials did not develop a
policy theory and policy instrument to assess the projects proposed by local policy makers.
The relevance of Belgium’s urban renewal policy is clearly limited if we look at its
means or future. However, the Belgian experiment remains relevant for thinking through
alternatives to neoliberal urban policies. If supra-local governments elsewhere seek to
improve the position of the weakest groups in the housing market, they could learn from
the implementation problems analyzed here. This is especially important in the context of
a recession. Since governments tighten their budgets for social and urban policies, the
question of where their expenditure will generate the most benefit becomes more urgent.
Alternatives to the neoliberal ‘common sense’ not only need ‘social intentions’ as
expressed in the positive rhetoric of ‘mixing’ and ‘balance’ but also a well thought-out
policy framework. The reason is that goal displacement may occur when local govern-
ments seek to use federal funds for social programs to promote gentrification. The prob-
ability that policies are perverted in this way only increases in times of recession.
Desperate to promote at least some development, local governments may be tempted to
stimulate growth in areas that already have a strong position. While the gentrification of
attractive yet poor neighborhoods may result in social mixing in the short run, the medium-
to long-term effect is to accelerate displacement and reinforce segregation. Our argument
is that such temptations to develop in the most attractive areas have to be resisted, both
institutionally and intellectually. If we believe that residents in gentrifying neighborhoods
profit if they can stay, the policy answer should not be to promote gentrification but to let
as many people stay as possible by countering displacement. Conversely, in areas that
suffer from decline, there is a point in stimulating development. The crucial question is
thus when and where to intervene. Our review of the Belgian policy suggests that the
designation of neighborhoods is not a residual or marginal part of the policy process. The
same sort of measure (promoting home ownership among the lower-middle class, for
instance) can have radically different repercussions depending on the context where it is
implemented. Rent gap theory might provide a theoretical framework for designating
neighborhoods, as it could enable policy makers to identify the dynamism of neighbor-
hoods and assess potential policy measures.
Our suggestions for an anti-cyclical logic underpinning social urban renewal allow
critics of gentrification to argue for a different type of social mixing policy. Luring middle-
and higher-income groups into deprived areas is one way to promote social mixing and an
apparently irresistible policy goal. While in the short term the result may indeed be that
neighborhoods become diverse, in the somewhat longer term the reduction of the share of
low-income groups may lead to homogeneous high-income areas and accentuate social-
spatial inequalities. Our proposals aim to achieve social mixing via a different route: by
preventing neighborhood decline and protecting lower-income groups against the threats of
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gentrification-induced displacement. Clearly these sorts of analyses will not sway policy
makers determined to cater to the middle classes or to reduce social housing, but they may
be helpful to government officials and academics who are looking for concrete and
comprehensive alternatives to current neoliberal policies.
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